plies 11500 miles from the Canal Zone to La Paz, thence through a 16,000-foot-high pass in the Andes Mountains, and down to the tropical savannah where the epidemic smoldered in the village of San Joaquin.
We soon recovered a viral agent from the spleen of a small boy who had died after a clinically typical illness. Shortly thereafter, a similar virus was isolated from Calomys callosus, the most common small rodent in the village. We struggled for many weeks to find a putative arthropod vector that transmitted this infection from mouse to man. In desperation, we organized a placebocontrolled campaign of mouse control. To our amazement, disease virtually ceased 2 weeks later, in the half of the town where ordinary snap traps were employed in each house. We moved the traps, and, after another 2 weeks, an 18-month-long grinding epidemic was history. We documented chronic infection in colonized C. callosus at our Middle America Research Unit (MARU) in the Canal Zone and named the virus "Machupo," after a small river that passed close by the village. Some mice failed to develop neutralizing antibodies against the virus. They experienced long-term high levels of viremia, in addition to constant viruria at the level of ∼500,000 infectious virions/mL. This finding provided an explanation for the slow but progressive infection of village residents. We were able to demonstrate that virus could be transmitted directly from mouse to mouse by wounds sustained during intraspecific fighting. Venereal transmission was found to be an even more important mechanism for maintenance of the virus in this sole rodent reservoir [6] .
By 1968, Machupo virus was linked both structurally and immunologically to the lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus of Mus musculus and to the Junin virus, the cause of a clinical disease indistinguishable from that in Bolivia. A new family, the Arenaviridae, was described [7, 8] .
Largely as a consequence of the Bolivian studies, I had the opportunity to visit the Soviet Union during 1969, as part of an American team of scientists who worked on distinct aspects of the emerging collection of hemorrhagic-fever viruses. Hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (HFRS) was the first priority for Soviet zoonotic science. We were not permitted to visit Soviet eastern Siberia, home to the severe form of this syndrome clinically identical to the hemorrhagic fever encountered by United Nations forces during the Korean conflict during the early 1950s; but we were taken to Ufa, a large city in a major oil field just west of the Ural Mountains, where a milder form of disease, similar to that first described in Scandinavia [9] , was endemic. Soviet epidemiologists had been convinced for many years that rodents in contact with humans were the reservoirs for the agent(s) that caused each illness.
One story held my attention. A young violinist in the local symphony orchestra had become ill during December of the preceding year. This man lived on the 10th floor of an apartment building in the center of the city. The only unusual event that his physicians could identify was a brief trip, 3 weeks before the onset of illness, to a small suburban market, to purchase fresh vegetables that had been stored underground since the fall harvest. Arthropods did not seem likely vectors for this infection. Our Soviet hosts felt that this case represented virus contamination of the vegetables, some of which were eaten raw, by either the saliva or the urine of an infected rodent. I surmised that HFRS might be caused by an agent related to the Bolivian arenavirus. The only shred of evidence for this notion was the putative chronic infection and viruria; arguing against such a relationship was the fact that HFRS had an incubation interval that could be as long as 4 weeks and that was marked by significant lymphocytosis, in contrast to the leukopenia characteristic of Bolivian hemorrhagic fever. Nevertheless, I returned to Panama and pondered a rodent search in Korea.
Serendipity shortly took a hand. Lt. Col. Bryce Walton, a parasitologist and director of a small Walter Reed Army Institute of Research contingent based at MARU, was promoted to full colonel and was assigned to an office in Tokyo, as administrator of a US Army infectious-diseases grant program in eastern Asia. His first duty was to make on-site evaluations of the work of each grantee. In Seoul, he encountered Dr. Ho Wang Lee. Dr. Lee was a Korean who had fled the North, had fought for South Korea, and afterward had studied medicine in the capital. He then had earned a Ph.D. in arbovirology, under Dr. William Scherer at the University of Minnesota. The purpose of his grant was to investigate the overwintering of Japanese encephalitis virus in snakes. Dr. Lee did not like snakes, nor could he recover that virus from them during cold Korean winters. But he was concerned about hemorrhagic fever. The wartime disease still infected several hundred farmers each year, as well as soldiers on training exercises. He asked whether he could switch targets for the remainder of his grant. Col. Walton liked that idea and promptly sent him to me at MARU.
Dr. Lee and I became almost instant friends. He shared my passions for golf and Scotch whisky and had good ideas about the Korean problem. We agreed that the clinical disease almost certainly had an immunological pathogenesis. The long incubation period and the pronounced increase in blood lymphocytes implied a strong immune reaction to the causative agent at the time when patients presented for medical care, a phenomenon that might account for the long-standing inability to recover an agent from acutely ill patients. So we decided that rodents in the rural zones where human disease occurred with regularity should be the primary targets. Antibodies to be used as probes would be derived from convalescent serum from patients who had survived severe hemorrhagic fever. I proposed that frozen rodent-tissue sections be probed with human antibody followed by anti-human serum tagged with fluorescein. Dr. Lee was not familiar with this technique and had neither the microtome nor the special microscope required for the procedure, so he chose to cocultivate rodent tissues and cultured primate cell lines.
I heard little from him for almost 2 years and was meanwhile immersed in a losing struggle to prevent MARU's closure as part of President Nixon's government employee-reduction program to prepare for his reelection bid. Then I received an invitation from Col. Walton's successor to visit Seoul. During a conference on parasites, I was to give a lecture on viruses, to evaluate Dr. Lee's claim that he had recovered, from rodent tissues, an agent that might be etiologic for hemorrhagic fever. I reviewed Dr. Lee's data and saw that he had 2 distinct viruses that caused cytopathic effects but had not shown by classic techniques that either of these viruses reacted with convalescent serum from human patients. I suggested that it might be time for the immunofluorescent method that we had discussed earlier.
He finally agreed that I could take his rodent agents back, to obtain definitive identification (they were herpesviruses and reoviruses), and he stated that he was ready to try my approach if he could have support to purchase the equipment and reagents that were required. Col. Marshall, who had replaced Col. Walton, supported this plan, and, before long, Dr. Lee was slicing and staining thin sections of rodent tissues from animals captured in the disease-endemic zone.
President Nixon achieved his reduction-in-force, and during the autumn of 1975 I moved to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). At the end of the year, I received a frantic message from Dr. Lee. Walter Reed program reviewers had terminated his grant; he had 6 months to complete his studies. But he claimed that he had the answer. I had urged him to concentrate on spleen and other lymphoid tissues, in the search for a virus that reacted with convalescent serum from humans. Happily, he went well beyond that Machupo-mistaken suggestion; he sliced from nose to tail and discovered that several organs, principally the lungs, of the field mouse, Apodemus agrarious, produced bright-green staining when the 2-step immunological procedure was performed. He used lung sections from infected mice to diagnose clinical disease even as patients entered the hospital. Our pathogenetic speculations were quickly confirmed.
But Dr. Lee was desperate; he planned to obtain wild Apodemus mice from a large island south of the Korean mainland, an island where HFRS had never been recognized, and to use them to obtain a replicating virus, but he could not finish that project in 6 months. I told him to be ready. I then called Jordi Casals at the Rockefeller Foundation labs at Yale University. Jordi had been with us for the 1969 visit to the Soviet Union, and I remembered that Prof. M. P. Chumakov had given him a set of acute and convalescent serum from patients in Siberia who had HFRS. I explained the situation to him and asked whether he could send me blind-coded small portions of both Soviet convalescent sera and sera from Americans who had never been to Asia. I sent them off to Seoul.
Three weeks later, Dr. Lee sent me a score card. It was 100% correct.
The Army tore up its grant-termination letter. Dr. Lee brought in hundreds of Apodemus mice. They became infected by tissues of antigen-positive wild mice of that single species. The etiologic agent of HFRS was identified in 1978, 25 years after the end of the Korean conflict [10] . Dr. Lee named it "Hantaan," after a small river near the border between the 2 Koreas, where human infection was endemic. Workers in Finland, using our methods, soon implicated a related virus that causes the milder form of HFRS [11] . With critical reagents and assays in hand, the next generation of scientists in my CDC lab needed !1 week to show that an acute pulmonary syndrome in the Four Corners region of the American Southwest was caused by another hantavirus [12] .
Hantaviruses are not arenaviruses. They represent a unique genus in the large zoonotic family of bunyaviruses [13] . Both virus taxa share the property of single-virus/single-host pairing for a given agent. Indeed, evidence continues to accumulate to support a concept of coevolution of specific host and parasite [14] .
My own naive notion about family relationships of viruses that cause these related but distinct clinical diseases was flat wrong. In perspective, I had the opportunity to elucidate the initial Bolivian syndrome, to examine distinct diseases in distant continents, and to give (albeit for the wrong reasons) the right advice that solved a chronic medical mystery. The correct comparative biology was finally defined, but, to that end, serendipity and the assistance of US military agencies were even more important than was scientific perspicacity.
